A timestamping scheme is non-interactive if a stamper can stamp a document without communicating with any other player. The only communication done is at validation time. Non-Interactive timestamping has many advantages, such as information theoretic privacy and enhanced robustness. Non-Interactive timestamping, however, is not possible against polynomial-time adversaries that have unbounded storage at their disposal. As a result, no non-interactive timestamping schemes were constructed up to date.
Introduction
The date on which a document was created is often a significant issue. Patents, contracts, wills, and countless other legal documents critically depend on the date they were signed, drafted, etc. A timestamp for a document provides convincing proof that it existed at a certain time. For physical documents, many methods are known and widely used for timestamping: publication, witnessed signing, and placing copies in escrow are among the most common. Techniques for timestamping digital documents, which are increasingly being used to replace their physical counterparts, have also become necessary.
Loosely speaking, a timestamping scheme consists of two mechanisms: A stamping mechanism, which allows a user to stamp a document at some specific time t, and a verification mechanism, which allows a recipient to verify at a later time t > t that the document was indeed stamped at time t.
Previous Work
Digital timestamping systems were first introduced by Haber and Stornetta [18] , where three timestamping systems are described. In the naïve timestamping protocol, the stamper sends the document to all the verifiers during timestamp generation. In the linking scheme, the stamper sends a one-way hash of the document to a trusted timestamping server. The server holds a current hash, which it updates by hashing it with the value sent by the stamper. This links the document to the previous documents and to the succeeding ones. In the distributed trust scheme, the document is used to select a subset of verifiers, to which the stamper sends a hash of the document. Bayer, Haber, and Stornetta [3] improve upon the linking scheme, reducing the communication and storage requirements of the system and increasing its robustness by replacing the linear list with a tree. Further work [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] 19 ] is mainly focused on additional improvements in terms of storage, robustness, and reducing the trust required in the timestamping server(s).
One common feature of all the above protocols is that they require the stamper to send messages to a central authority (or a distributed set of servers) at timestamp generation.
Non-interactive Timestamping
We call a timestamping scheme non-interactive if it does not require the stamper to send messages at timestamp generation. Non-interactive timestamping schemes, if they exist, have a number of obvious advantages over interactive schemes. However, the notion of non-interactive timestamping seems self-contradictory. How can we prevent an adversary from faking timestamps if no action is taken at timestamp generation? More precisely, suppose that an adversary "learns" some document at time t > t and wants to convince a verifier that he stamped the document at time t. He can simulate the behavior of an "honest stamper" who signs the document at time t and generates a timestamp for the document. Note that the "honest stamper" does not need to send any messages before time t , and therefore the adversary will be able to convince a verifier that the document was stamped at time t.
We can think of the adversary as an honest stamper who was corrupted at some later time. Therefore it is clear that giving the honest stamper secret information and/or allowing "standard" cryptographic assumptions (that some function is infeasible to compute) will not help: anything the honest stamper can do, the adversary must be able to do as well. Even allowing the verifier to send messages to the stamper (but not vice versa) does not invalidate the simulation argument, since the adversary has access to anything the honest stamper received in the past.
A crucial point in the argument above is that in order to perform this simulation the adversary must store all the information available to the "honest stamper" at time t. We show that non-interactive timestamping is possible in a scenario in which parties have bounded storage.
The Bounded-Storage Model
In contrast to the usual approach in modern Cryptography, Maurer's bounded-storage model [22] bounds the storage (memory size) of dishonest players rather than their running time.
In a typical protocol in the bounded-storage model, a long random string r of length R is initially broadcast, and the interaction between the polynomial-time participants is conducted based on storing small portions of r. The security of such protocols should be guaranteed even against dishonest parties which have a lot of storage (much more than the honest parties) as long as they cannot store the whole string. Most of the previous work on the bounded storage model concentrated on private key encryption [1, 2, 9, 13, 15, 21, 22, 34] , Key Agreement [9] , and Oblivious Transfer [10, 12, 14] . In contrast to the tasks above, the notion of non-interactive timestamping cannot be implemented in the "standard cryptographic setting." To the best of our knowledge, this is the first example of a protocol in the bounded-storage model which achieves a task that is impossible in the "standard cryptographic setting."
Non-interactive Timestamping in the Bounded-Storage Model
We now explain our setting for non-interactive timestamping in the bounded-storage model. We assume that there are rounds and at every round 1 ≤ t ≤ , a long random string r of length R is transmitted. 1 The Stamping Mechanism To stamp a document doc at time t, the scheme specifies a function Stamp(doc, r) whose output is short. To stamp the document doc, the stamper stores Stamp(doc, r). Intuitively, an adversary (who does not know doc at time t) is not able to store the relevant information and therefore is unable to stamp doc.
The Verification Mechanism* The verifier stores a short "sketch" of r (denoted by Sketch(r)) for every time t. At a later time the stamper can send the timestamp Stamp(doc, r), and the verifier checks whether this timestamp is "consistent" with his sketch.
Efficiency of a Timestamping Scheme
We say that a timestamping scheme is (T , V )-efficient if the stamper's algorithm runs online (that is, in one pass) using space T and polynomial time and the verifier's algorithm runs online using space V and polynomial time. We want T and V to be small as functions of R.
Our Notion of Security
Loosely speaking, we want to ensure that even an adversary with a lot of storage (say storage M = δR for some constant δ < 1) cannot forge a timestamp. Note, however, that a stamper with storage M > T can easily stamp k = M/T documents by running the stamping mechanism on some k documents and storing the generated timestamps (each of which has length at most T ). We will therefore say that a scheme is secure if no adversary with space M can successfully stamp significantly more than M/T documents. More precisely, security is defined with respect to a parameter M * max which bounds the storage of the most powerful adversary. The scheme is α-optimal (for a parameter α > 1) if for every M ≤ M max , no adversary with space M can successfully stamp more than α M T documents. (The precise definitions appear in Sect. 3) . Notice that the definition above requires α-optimality for every M ≤ M max . Requiring α-optimality for M max only, would have allowed adversaries with M M max to produce M max T stamped documents, contradicting the spirit of definition. The definition in its current form assures us that any adversary, weak or strong, with at most M max memory, can honestly stamp the same number of documents if given slightly more resources (storage αM instead of M).
Usefulness of Our Notion of Security
Let us illustrate the usefulness of this notion by an example. Suppose that there is a random variable V that is uniformly distributed over a large set. Furthermore, suppose that the value of this variable is known only to some parties at time t and is revealed to everybody at time t > t. (This is a formal way of saying that some parties do not know the value of V at time t). Note that parties that do know the value v of the variable V at time t can timestamp the document doc = "The value is v." Such a timestamp indeed convinces a verifier that this party knew the value v at time t. This is because a stamper who did not know the value of V at time t will be caught cheating. Specifically, our definition of security says that there exists a set (that is defined in time t) of at most α M T of documents which the stamper can successfully stamp. Note that the random variable V is uniformly distributed from the point of view of the stamper at time t. Therefore, the probability that a document containing the correct value of V appears in any of the α M T documents that the adversary can successfully stamp is very small, and it follows that no matter how the stamper acts with high probability, he will not be able to convince the verifier at time t that he stamped the document at time t.
We remark that this argument applies if V is not uniformly distributed but rather "unpredictable" in the sense that it has high min-entropy.
Our Results
In this paper we give two explicit constructions of non-interactive timestamping schemes in the bounded-storage model. The first is secure in an information-theoretic sense (in the spirit of previous constructions in the bounded-storage model). It requires no unproven assumptions and is secure against any adversary with arbitrary computational power as long as its storage capability is bounded. We now state this result (precise definitions appear in Sect. 3, and the theorem is restated in Theorem 4.2 with some more precise notation). We remark that our technique can potentially reduce T and V to log O(1) R. This improvement requires an explicit construction of certain "expander graphs" that is not known today. More details appear in Sect. 5.
Non-malleable Timestamping
The notion of security defined above makes sense in certain applications. However, this notion does not take into account that a dishonest stamper may see some correct timestamps of related documents before he attempts to timestamp his document. Note that seeing correct timestamps may indeed give the dishonest stamper additional information on the random string which he did not know at time t.
In Sect. 6 we present stronger security definitions that address this more complicated setup. The high-level idea is that we consider a stronger adversary which first views the random string and stores some information about it, then before attempting to timestamp his own document, the adversary is allowed to request to see correct timestamps of few "hint documents" doc 1 , . . . , doc w that he may choose in any way that he want as a function of his own document. We require that even such an adversary cannot successfully stamp more than α M * T documents. Our definition allows the adversary to choose the hint documents as a function of his own document. (This guarantees that even seeing correct timestamps of related documents does not help the adversary). Furthermore, note that when we require that the adversary can successfully stamp few documents, we allow him to choose different hint documents for different documents that he attempts to stamp.
We show that our information theoretic scheme is secure even with this more general security definition. However, to implement our scheme in this setup, we need explicit constructions of expander graphs with certain parameters that are currently not known. Therefore, this result does not give an explicit solution.
Overview of the "Information-Theoretic" Construction
We now give a high-level overview of our two constructions. The setup is the following: A string r of length R is transmitted, and the stamper wants to convince a verifier that he "knew" a document prior to the transmission of this string.
Using the Document to Select Indices
We implement the function Stamp(doc, r) as follows: Each document doc specifies some D indices that the stamper will remember from the long string. For that, we use a bipartite graph where the left-hand vertices are all possible documents, the right-hand vertices are indices 1 ≤ i ≤ R, and every left vertex has D neighbors. The indices selected by a document doc are the neighbors of doc. We want to force a stamper who would like to stamp k documents to store many indices. Intuitively, this is equivalent to the requirement that every k documents on the left have many different neighbors. This naturally leads to using an expander graph. (A bipartite graph is a (K, c)-expander if every k ≤ K vertices on the left have at least kc neighbors on the right.) 2 To stamp a document doc, the stamper stores the content of the long string at the indices specified by doc. We use graphs with expansion c ≈ D, which implies that to correctly stamp k documents simultaneously, an honest stamper must store roughly kD bits.
Using Random Sets for Verification
The function Sketch(r) is implemented as follows. The verifier chooses a random subset of size |H| ≈ R/D from the indices of r and stores the content of r at these indices. After the transmission of the random string r, a stamper may send a timestamp of a document doc (that consists of the content of r at the D indices defined by doc). By the birthday problem, with high probability (over the choice of the verifier's random set), some of these indices were also stored by the verifier. The verifier checks that the content sent by the stamper is consistent with what he stored.
For a fixed string r and document doc, we say that a timestamp is "incorrect" if it differs from the "correct" timestamp of doc in many indices. The verification process we described guarantees that, with high probability, the verifier will reject an "incorrect" timestamp.
A Sketch of the Security Proof
The basic intuition for the security proof is the following: Suppose that an adversary is able to successfully stamp some k documents. This means that he correctly stamped these k documents (since otherwise he is caught by the verifier). However, correctly stamping k documents requires storing kD indices, therefore if the storage of the adversary is kD ≤ M < (k + 1)D, he can successfully stamp at most k documents. This is the best we can hope for (by our notion of security) since he could have stamped k documents by simply running the "stamping mechanism" on any k documents.
We remark that the actual argument given in Sect. 4 is more complex. This is because we allow the adversary to choose the k documents on which he wants to convince the verifier as a function of the random string r. This complicates the proof. To prove the security of our scheme, we use a "reconstruction argument" and show that any adversary that breaks the security guarantee can be used to compress the string r into a shorter string in a way that does not lose a lot of information. Since the string r is random, we get a contradiction. The details are given in Sect. 4.
Overview of the "Computationally-Secure" Construction
In the previous construction we chose |H| ≈ R/D so that a random subset of size |H| in [R] would intersect a subset of size D. We chose |H| = D ≈ √ R, allowing both the honest stamper and the verifier to store only √ R bits. We now show how to increase the efficiency and reduce the storage of honest parties to only 2 (log log R) O(1) bits.
We use the same index selection mechanism as before. However, this time we choose D = 2 (log log R) O(1) (this precise choice of parameters corresponds to certain expander graphs). The verifier stores a short "hash" of the string r. When stamping a document, the stamper also supplies a short "proof" that the indices he sent are consistent with the hashed value held by the verifier. We implement such a hashing scheme using Merkle trees [23] . We show that if collision resistant hash functions exist, then a polynomialtime adversary with bounded storage cannot produce an incorrect timestamp of a document. More precisely, we show that after the transmission of the random string r, no polynomial time adversary can generate many documents and stamp them correctly.
Hashing Documents Before Stamping Them A bottleneck of our scheme is that when using expanders of degree D, we can only handle documents of length D. 3 However, in a computational setting (as we have already assumed the existence of collision resistant hash functions), we can stamp longer documents by first hashing them to shorter strings and then stamping them.
Preliminaries

Notation
The following conventions will be used throughout the paper.
Random String
We refer to the random string as r, its length is denoted by R, and we think of it as composed of N blocks of length n denoted r 1 , . . . , r N . For any subset S ⊆ [N], the expression r |S will be taken to mean the string generated by concatenating the blocks r i for all i ∈ S.
Hamming Distance The Hamming Distance between two strings r 1 and r 2 is the number of blocks on which the two strings differ (rather than the number of bits).
Online Space We will be interested in procedures that have small memory and read an enormous stream of bits. We say that a function f can be computed online with space s if there is an algorithm using space at most s which reads its input bits one by one and computes f in one pass.
Unbalanced Expander Graphs
A graph is expanding if every sufficiently small set has a lot of neighbors. Our timestamping scheme relies on unbalanced expanders. We give the proof of Theorem 2.2 in Sect. 7.
Definition 2.1 (Unbalanced Expander Graphs). A bipartite graph
G = (V 1 , V 2 , E) is (K max ,
Collision Resistant Hash Functions and Merkle Hash Trees
We need the notion of collision resistant hash functions which is implied by standard assumptions on the hardness of factoring integers (see [11, 16] ). We sometimes need functions that are secure against adversaries that run in super-polynomial time (see, e.g., [20] ) and therefore we use a parameter for the running time of the adversary: Definition 2.3 (Collision Resistant Hash Functions). A family of functions H : {0, 1} 2n → {0, 1} n is said to be ( H (n), μ(n))-collision resistant if there is a polynomialtime algorithm that, given the description of h ∈ H and an input x ∈ {0, 1} 2n , outputs h(x). Furthermore, given a random function h ∈ H , no algorithm with running time bounded by μ(n) can find x = y such that h(x) = h(y) with probability greater than H (n), where the probability is over the choice of h and the random coins of the algorithm, and n is large enough.
We use Merkle hash trees [23] . We give a detailed definition so that we can later use the notation in our construction. (N, n) , μ(N, n))-secure if, for any adversary with running time bounded by μ(N, n), the probability that it can output a set of leaves (r 1 , . . . , r N ), an index i ≤ N , and a valid path from r i that is incorrect for Tree h (r 1 , . . . , r N ) is less than H (N, n) (where the probability is over the choice of h and the random coins of the algorithm).
Definition 2.4 (Merkle Hash Tree
The following standard lemma observes that collision-resistant hash functions are sufficient to build Merkle trees (we sometimes set N to be super-polynomial in n, and this is why we need very strong collision resistant hash functions): Lemma 2.6 [23] . Let H : {0, 1} 2n → {0, 1} n be an ( H (n), μ(n))-collision resistant family of hash functions. Then the Merkle tree construction based on H is
Informally, this is because if we can find two valid but differently labeled paths to the root from the same leaf in the tree, we have found a collision in the hash function.
Given an adversary that can find a set of leaves and an incorrect but valid path from one of them to the root, we can find a second valid path by computing the correct path to the root for the same set of leaves (computing this second path can take O(Nn O (1) ) time, since we may have to compute the hash function for each node of the tree).
Merkle Trees and Storage
We now note that certain tasks related with Merkle trees can be done with small storage. To check whether a given path is valid requires a verifier to store h and Root h (r 1 , . . . , r N ) but not the rest of the tree. To prove that r i is a leaf in Tree h (r 1 , . . . , r N ) , the prover needs to store only Path h i (r 1 , . . . , r N ), which is logarithmic in N .
We furthermore note that Merkle paths (and in particular the root of the Merkle tree) can be computed online with small storage when given sequential one-way access to r 1 , . . . , r N . More precisely, assuming that the computation of the hash function can be done for free, it is possible to compute Merkle paths online with space O(n log N). This is done by computing the paths sequentially and keeping in memory only the roots of the subtrees whose leaves have been seen so far (i.e., after we are given r 1 and r 2 , we can compute h(r 1 , r 2 ) and forget the values of r 1 and r 2 ; in the same way after we have seen r 1 , . . . , r 2 k , we can remember only the label of the common ancestor for these leaves, forgetting all the nodes in the subtree).
One Round Timestamping: The Model
In this section we formally define our model for timestamping in the bounded-storage model. In order to simplify the presentation, we assume that there are only two time frames. Our model and constructions can be easily adapted to the case of multiple time frames (see Remark 3.5).
We now explain the formal model. A long random string r of length R is transmitted. The verifier takes a short sketch Sketch(r) of the random string and remembers it. An honest stamper, who wants to stamp a document doc ∈ DOC, calculates y = Stamp(doc, r). When, at a later stage, the stamper wants to prove he knew the document doc at stamping time, he sends y to the verifier who computes Verify(Sketch(r), doc, y) and decides whether to accept or reject. More formally: Definition 3.1 (Non-interactive Timestamping Scheme). A non-interactive timestamping scheme consists of three functions:
• A stamping function Stamp(doc, r).
• A sketch function Sketch(r) (we allow Sketch to be a probabilistic function).
• A verification function Verify(Sketch(r), doc, y).
We require that for every string r and document doc, the function Verify(Sketch(r), doc, Stamp(doc, r)) accepts.
We define efficiency:
Definition 3.2 (Efficiency). A non-interactive timestamping scheme is (T , V )-efficient if Stamp can be computed online in space T = T (R) and time polynomial in R and if Sketch can be computed online in space V = V (R) and time polynomial in R.
An honest stamper with space M can easily stamp M/T documents by running the function Stamp in parallel. We require that no adversary with memory M * can successfully stamp significantly more than M * /T documents. We first define our model for adversaries: Definition 3.3 (Adversary). An adversary consists of two functions: Store * (r), which produces a "short" string b, and Stamp * (doc, b), which, given a document doc and b, attempts to produce a timestamp for doc. The space M * of an adversary is the maximal length of Store * (r). 4 An adversary γ -successfully stamps a document doc at (some fixed) r if
where this probability is over the coin tosses of Sketch and the internal random coins of the adversary. Note that when the adversary is not computationally bounded, we can assume w.l.o.g. that the adversary is deterministic (does not use random coins).
We denote the set of documents that an adversary A γ -successfully stamps for a given string r by Successful (A,γ ) (r).
We define security as:
Definition 3.4 (Security). We say that a (T , V )-efficient timestamping scheme is
Definition 3.4 is very strong. It guarantees that whenever the sketch size is small, no matter how powerful the adversary is, the number of documents the adversary can successfully stamp is very small. Moreover, any strategy the adversary chooses for his Store * function can be replaced with a legitimate strategy that uses roughly the same storage and successfully stamps the same number of documents.
We now discuss some more issues that come up in the security definition.
Remark 3.5 (Multiple Time Frames)
. The definition stated above has only two time frames: "before" and "after" the random string was transmitted. It can be easily extended to the case of multiple time frames assuming that a random string is transmitted at any time frame.
Remark 3.6 (What Does doc Depend on?)
. One thing that is hard to model is how the adversary gets hold of the document doc that it attempts to stamp. We stress that in the definition above the adversary is allowed to choose doc as a function of the random string r. (This can be seen from the fact that the set Successful is allowed to depend on r). We remark that the security proofs of the next sections could be significantly simplified if this was not the case. The reason we insist on the stronger notion of security is that it would have been bad if, for many random strings r, the adversary had many documents that he would be able to successfully stamp.
Remark 3.7.
Another issue is that the adversary may later on receive additional information about the random string r, beyond the value of Store * (r). This is because the adversary may see correct timestamps of some other documents. We find the following example helpful. Suppose that Alice correctly stamped a patent saying that she is the inventor. When revealing the timestamp, it is undesirable that a cheating party Eve can now use this information to produce a timestamp of the same document but for replacing the name "Alice" by "Eve." In Sect. 6, we suggest a stronger notion of security that attempts to handle such situations.
Security Against Time-Bounded Adversaries
The definition used above does not bound the computational power of the adversary in any way. The only assumption we made is on the storage capacities of the adversary (which is reflected in the output length of Store * ). We now consider adversaries which are also time bounded.
Definition 3.8 (Time-Bounded Adversary). We say that an adversary runs in time t if the functions Store
* and Stamp * associated with it are randomized machines running in time t.
We now want to define timestamps that are secure against time-bounded adversaries. Recall that an unbounded adversary is considered successful if there exist many documents for which he can convince the verifier. When the adversary is time-bounded, it is possible that Definition 3.4 does not hold, yet the system is still secure because it is infeasible to find the documents he can illegally stamp.
This leads us to a weaker notion of security. In this setup an adversary is considered successful if it is possible to feasibly generate many documents on which the adversary can convince the verifier. This is captured by requiring that there exists a probabilistic polynomial time machine Generate * c which, on input r and an integer k, outputs k documents (which, intuitively, are the documents the adversary thinks he can succeed on). The formal definition follows: Definition 3.9 (Security Against Feasibly Generated Documents). We say that a (T , V )-efficient timestamping scheme is α-optimal (for ρ > 0, α ≥ 1, γ > 0, and M * max < R) against feasibly generated documents if for every M * ≤ M * max , every adversary A with space M * , and every machine Generate * c (r, k) that runs in time polynomial in the length of r:
Pr A γ -successfully stamps at r the documents Generate * c r, α
where the probability is over the choice of r and the random coins of Generate * c and A.
Note that in the definition above we do not explicitly require that the adversary is time bounded, however we will use it mainly for time-bounded adversaries. Furthermore, note that there are no storage bounds on Generate * c .
A Scheme with Information-Theoretic Security
In this section we describe a timestamping scheme which is information theoretically secure against arbitrary adversaries with small storage.
The Stamping Scheme
Let R, N , and n be integers such that R = N · n. Given a string r ∈ {0, 1} R , we partition it into N blocks of n bits. We use r i to denote the ith block of r. Let DOC denote the set of all documents which can be stamped. Let G be a (K max , βD) bipartite expander
with left degree D, where the "left" set V 1 is DOC, and the "right" set V 2 is [N]. We define the three procedures Sketch, Stamp, and Verify:
where H is a multi-set that has |H| elements selected at random (with repetition) from [N]. (Note that Sketch is probabilistic and relies on internal random coins of the verifier that are used to choose H.)
Reject otherwise.
In words, the adversary compares the content of r in the indices he stored to the indices sent by the stamper and accepts if the two strings are consistent.
Notice that Sketch(r) contains the restriction of r to the indices of H and therefore in particular contains the restriction of r to the indices of H ∩ Γ (doc), and y contains the restriction of r to Γ (doc) and therefore in particular contains the restriction of r to the indices of H ∩ Γ (doc).
To assist the reader we include a reference of all the parameters in Table 1 . The following theorem states requirements on the parameters with which the system is secure. It is immediately followed by a corollary in which we plug in specific parameters. Plugging in parameters, a corollary of this is the following restatement of Theorem 1.1. 
, and M * max = Ω(R). The timestamping scheme allows stamping documents of length R Ω (1) .
We prove Theorem 4.2 in Subsect. 4.6. We now turn to proving Theorem 4.1.
Efficiency
The verifier first chooses a random set H and stores it, and then stores r H . This can indeed be done online with space V = 2|H|n). We now explain how the stamper can run online in space T = Dn. Observe that it can calculate the indices it will need to store before the random string goes by (since it knows doc before it sees the random string). As the indices take D log N < Dn space, it can work in place, replacing each index with the contents of the block as it goes by. We now turn to proving security.
Security
The proof below is somewhat technical and involves many parameters, and we therefore start with a high-level outline.
High-Level Outline of the Argument
Our goal is to show that no adversary with space M * ≤ M * max can successfully stamp more than k = αM * /T documents. The notion of "successfully stamping" speaks about whether or not the verifier accepts the timestamp.
The first stage is to show that whenever the adversary "successfully stamps" a document, he must provide a string which is close in Hamming distance to the correct timestamp. In such a case we say that the adversary "correctly stamps" the document. The second stage is to show that an adversary with bounded storage cannot correctly stamp too many documents.
The first stage in our plan is relatively simple. Recall that the set H is chosen by the verifier in a way that is independent of the adversary's actions. If the adversary provides a timestamp which is far in Hamming distance than the correct one, then with high probability (over the verifier's coins) some of the incorrect indices will be selected by the verifier and the verifier will not accept the timestamp. The first stage follows.
We now turn our attention to the second phase. Our security definitions allow the adversary to attempt to stamp different k documents for different strings r. Nevertheless, for the sake of simplicity, let us first rule out an adversary for which there is a set S (that does not depend on r) of k documents such the adversary can successfully stamp all of them on any choice of r.
By the expansion properties of the graph we have that |Γ (S)| ≥ βDk indices which translate into βDnk = βT k = βαM * bits. Thus, choosing α slightly larger than 1/β, one gets that the documents in S require more storage than is available to the adversary.
In the general case the adversary may choose the set S as a function of r (see Remark 3.6). This technically complicates the argument for the second phase. What we show is that an adversary that successfully stamps many documents using short storage can be translated into a "compression scheme" that can compress the string r into a shorter string and that there is a decompression scheme that decompresses correctly with high probability. It follows that such adversaries do not exist. The remainder of the section gives formal proofs.
We now start implementing the plan described above. Without loss of generality, we assume that the adversary is deterministic (this can be done since the adversary is computationally unbounded). Fix some adversary and let R successful (k) = R γ successful (k) denote the set of strings r on which the adversary γ -successfully stamps at least k documents. We would like to prove that R successful has small probability. We first define a notion of "correct stamping": Let g = 1/5, and let R correct (k) = R err=gβD correct (k) denote the set of random strings r for which there are at least k documents that the adversary correctly stamps with at most err = gβD errors.
The security proof has two parts. We first show that if the adversary successfully stamps many documents, then he correctly stamps many documents. That is, we relate R correct and R successful . 
Lemma 4.4. Assume that D|H| ≥
The proof of Lemma 4.5 appears in Sect. 4.5. We now show that the two lemmata give the proof of Theorem 4.1:
Proof of Theorem 4.1. We need to show that no adversary with space M * can γ -successfully stamp more than In particular, for every r and doc for which the stamper is γ successful, err ≤ N |H| ln( 1 γ ) ≤ gβD. Hence, the stamper correctly stamps doc at r with at most err = gβD errors. It follows that R successful (k) ⊆ R correct (k), as desired.
The Proof of Lemma 4.5
We first define a compression function Com(r) for r ∈ R correct (k). Let r ∈ R correct (k). Suppose that doc 1 , . . . , doc k are the documents that the adversary correctly stamps at r with at most err errors. Denote Γ = 1≤i≤k Γ (doc i ) that is the set of all indices which are selected by one of the k documents, and letΓ = [N ] \ Γ denote the remaining indices. Let BAD(doc i ) denote the set of indices that appear in the timestamp of doc i and whose content is incorrect. Let BAD = 1≤i≤k BAD(doc i ) that is the set of all indices which are bad for at least one of the k documents. We call an index j ∈ Γ \ BAD useful. We choose Com(r) to be Com(r) = doc 1 , . . . , doc k ; Store * (r); r |Γ ; BAD; r |BAD .
We define a "decompression" function Dec(a) that gets Com(r) as input and tries to recover r. Let r be a string from R correct , i.e., a string on which the stamper correctly stamps k-documents with at most err errors . From doc 1 , . . . , doc k that appear in Com(r) we recover the set Γ , and from Com(r) we learn which indices are in the subset BAD ⊂ Γ . Now, for every 1 ≤ j ≤ N , we recover r j as follows:
• If j ∈ Γ , then we use the information in r |Γ to find r j .
• If j ∈ BAD, then we use the information in r |BAD to find r j .
• If j ∈ Γ \ BAD, then we find i such that j ∈ Γ (doc i ). We run Stamp * (doc i , Store * (r)) and take r j from its output.
The only case where we do not take the value of r j directly from Com(r) is for j ∈ Γ \ BAD. However, all such indices j are useful, and therefore we correctly decode them. Therefore, for every r ∈ R correct , we have Dec(Com(r)) = r.
We now analyze the output length of the compression function Com. The documents doc 1 , . . . , doc k take k log |DOC| bits space. By definition we have that |Store * (r)| ≤ M * . We have that G is expanding and k ≤ K max . It follows that |Γ | ≥ βkD and therefore r |Γ ≤ R − βkDn. We represent BAD ⊆ Γ by a binary vector of length |Γ | ≤ kD which has a "one" for indices in Γ ∩ BAD and a "zero" for indices in Γ \ BAD. Each of the k documents is correctly stamped at r with at most err errors, and therefore for every such document doc i , we have |BAD doc i | ≤ err and |BAD| ≤ k · err. The representation of r |BAD is therefore bounded by k · err · n. We conclude that the total length of the output of Com is at most k log |DOC| + M * + R − βkDn + kD + k · err · n. We denote this quantity R − Δ. Since every r ∈ R correct has a small description (of length R − Δ), we have |R correct | ≤ 2 R−Δ , and therefore Pr[r ∈ R correct ] ≤ 2 −Δ . We have required that n ≥ 1/gβ, and therefore kD ≤ gβkDn. We also have err = gβD and by our assumption log |DOC| ≤ gβnD.
Proof of Theorem 4.2
We plug into Theorem 4.1 the (K max , βD)-expanding graph of Theorem 2.2 to get a concrete result. The result then follows by choosing the remaining parameters. More precisely, let β > 0 be the constant that is guaranteed in Theorem 2.2. We are going to set the parameter n to n = log N . Note that for large enough N , n ≥ 5/β.
Let η > 0 be some constant. We set |H| = D = N 1/2+η and γ = 2 −N η . Thus, D|H| = N 1+2η ≥ We first show that we can achieve log |DOC| ≥ D Ω (1) . By Theorem 2.2 we have that
for some constant a. Setting log |DOC| = D 1 2a , we can get a graph with degree bounded by 
An Efficient Scheme Secure Against Polynomial-Time Adversaries
The scheme suggested in Sect. 4 requires the honest parties (stamper and verifier) to store many bits, namely T V > R, where T is the stamp size, V the sketch size, and R the random string length. In other words, if the stamp size is small (say T = log R), then the sketch size V is almost all of the random string. Our second scheme has a very small sketch and stamp size. This is achieved by using the previous stamping scheme with small T and using a different verification method that allows the verifier to use much less storage. This verification method is valid only against computationally bounded adversaries and takes advantage of the bounded computational capabilities of the cheating party.
The Stamping Scheme
Let H be a family of collision resistant hash functions and R = log |H | + Nn. We partition a string r ∈ {0, 1} R into N + 1 blocks, denoted r 0 , r 1 , . . . , r N , where r 0 is of length log |H |, and for i > 0, r i is of length n. The string r 0 (which did not appear in the previous scheme) serves as a "key" to the hash function. We use the same "index selection" mechanism as in Sect. 4; G is a bipartite graph with left degree D, where the left set is the set DOC, and the right set is the set [N] . We now describe the stamp and sketch and verify procedures (we use the subscript "c" to distinguish these functions from the ones given in Sect. Plugging in the expander construction of Theorem 2.2 and collision resistant hash functions, we obtain a scheme with efficiency 2 (log log R) O(1) . This is stated formally in the next theorem. (We remark that Theorem 5.2 is almost a formal restatement of Theorem 1.2. The only difference is that the scheme in Theorem 5.2 only allows one to stamp short documents of length 2 (log log R) O(1) rather than documents of length R. We will deal with this problem separately in Sect. 5.5.) (1) and c > 1 be some constant.
Theorem 5.2. Let H be an ( H (n), μ(n))-collision resistant hash family with μ(n)
= 1 H (n) = 2 2 (log n) Ω
Assume that the adversary has running time polynomial in R. There exists a scheme that is (T = 2 (log log R) O(1) , V = 2 (log log R) O(1) )-efficient and O(log R)-optimal against feasibly generated documents for ρ = neg(R) and M * max = Ω(R). The scheme allows stamping documents of length
Here neg(R) is a negligible function of R (a function is negligible in R if for any constant c, there exists some R c such that ∀R > R c : neg(R) < R −c ). Letting ρ be a negligible function in R is a natural requirement when dealing with polynomially bounded adversaries: the probability of breaking the scheme by repeating an action that succeeds with negligible probability remains negligible even after a polynomial number of repetitions.
We prove Theorem 5.2 in Subsect. 5.4. It is possible to get an even more efficient scheme with T = V = (log R) O(1) . However, this result requires a better graph than the one constructed in Theorem 2.2. It is folklore that such graphs exist by a probabilistic argument. In Subsect. 5.6 we survey the parameters that can be achieved if such graphs are explicitly constructed. In the remainder of the section we prove Theorem 5.1. 5 Recall that in this scheme the verifier is deterministic. Thus, γ is unimportant, and we therefore omit it in this section. To be strictly formal, all the propositions in this section apply for any γ > 0.
Efficiency
The efficiency parameters are derived from the fact that it is possible to compute a path of a Merkle tree online in space O(n log N) when not taking the complexity of the hash function into account. The hash function can be computed, by our assumption, in space O(Dn log N), and therefore the verifier (who stores only the root) can run online in space O(n log N) + O(Dn log N) = O (Dn log N) . The stamper calculates the indices it will need before it sees r. It computes the Merkle paths of these leaves and stores the labels for the paths it will need for stamping as it goes along. There are D paths where each is of length O(n log N). By using additional O(Dn log N) space to compute the hash function, the stamper can run online in space O (Dn log N) . This proves the efficiency of the scheme. We now turn to proving security.
Security
We follow the outline of the correctness proof of the information-theoretic version of Sect. 4, except that now we work with security for generated documents. We show that if the adversary successfully stamps many documents, then he correctly stamps many documents, which is impossible by the "reconstruction argument" of the previous section.
Fix some adversary with memory M * and running time to be specified later. We use coins to denote the concatenation of the random coins used by Store * c , Stamp * c , and Generate * c . We define R . This definition of success corresponds to the notion of security in Definition 3.9. We prove:
Lemma 5.3. There exists a polynomial p(·) such that if the adversary runs in time at most
Proof. Assume not. Then, given a random h, we generate a random r by setting r 0 = h and choosing r 1 , . . . , r N at random and pick coins at random. We run Store * c (r) (using coins) and compute Generate * c (r, k) to get k documents doc 1 , . . . , doc k . We now simulate the adversary's timestamp on these documents by running Stamp * c . In addition we compute the correct timestamps on these documents and we also run the verifier to check whether the timestamps are accepted.
We know that, with probability at least H , we have that there is at least one document on which the adversary was successful but did not provide the correct timestamp. We can identify this document (as we have the correct timestamps) and check the Merkle paths associated with it. Note that on this document the adversary has to provide a Merkle path that is valid with respect to r 1 , . . . , r N but is incorrect.
Thus, the procedure we described finds a valid, incorrect path for Tree h (r 1 , . . . , r N ) with probability H . Let us examine the running time of this procedure. There exists some polynomial p(·) such that this procedure runs in time p(R) times the running time of the adversary. Since we assume that the running time of the adversary is less than (in fact, the parameters are slightly better because we have err = 0 and therefore BAD is empty). Note that Lemma 4.5 is true for any adversary-it makes no assumptions about its running time or uniformity-therefore our use of A instead of A is allowed. T = K max , the probability that an adversary can generate and stamp more than k documents is less than 2 −gβnDk + H ≤ 2 −gβnD + H = ρ, which proves Theorem 5.1.
Proof. By an averaging argument there exists some fixed value coins of coins such that
Pr r (r, coins ) ∈ R comp correct (k) ≥ Pr r,coins (r, coins) ∈ R comp correct (k) . Let R correct (k) = {r|(r, coins ) ∈ R comp correct (k)}. Note that R correct (k) ⊆ R err=0 correct (k),
Proof of Theorem 5.2
Let η > 0 be a constant. We use the explicit expander of Theorem 2.2 with left-hand set DOC, right-hand set of size N , left degree D, and which is (K max , βD)-expanding, where we set The degree of this graph is
where the inequalities follow by K max ≤ N and by choosing D = 2 (log log N) v , where v > 3 is a constant to be chosen later. We choose n = 2 (log log N) 2/a , where a is the constant hidden in the Ω(·) in the condition on μ in Theorem 5.2. We observe that μ(n) and 1 H (n) are greater than any polynomial in N and that N = R n ≥ √ R. We will make sure that e > 2/a , so that the space needed to compute the hash function (which is some fixed polynomial in n = 2 (log log N) 2/a ) is less than D = 2 (log log N) v . Thus, the space of the hash function is bounded by D ≤ Dn log N , as required. We meet all the requirements of Theorem 5.1 and conclude that the scheme is (T , V )-
, as required, and the scheme is O(log R)-optimal for ρ = 2 −D = neg(R). The scheme can stamp documents of length βDn/5 ≥ D. By setting v ≥ 2c we have that D = 2 (log log N) v ≥ 2 (log log R) c .
Stamping Longer Documents
The timestamping system described in this section has good security parameters but only works if log |DOC| = 2 (log log R) a for a small constant a. This is somewhat small (recall that honest parties run in time polynomial in R). However, using the standard technique of collision resistant hashing, we can convert any timestamping system which works for short documents into a system which works for longer documents by first hashing the documents and then stamping them. When applying this to the scheme of Theorem 5.2, we get a scheme which allows stamping documents of length R. This requires the same assumption on collision resistant hash functions which was used to derive Theorem 5.2.
We now explain this transformation more formally. Let Stamp c , Sketch c , and Verify c be the stamping and verification functions for the original scheme, which stamps documents of length log |DOC|. Assume that there exists H : {0, 1} R → {0, 1} n that is an ( H (n), μ(n))-collision resistant hash family. We will use this hash function with n = log |DOC|.
Given r, we partition it into h, r , where |h| = log |H | will be used to select a function from H . We define the new procedures Sketch long , Stamp long , and Verify long .
• Sketch long (r) = h, Sketch c (r ) • Stamp long (doc, r) = Stamp c (h(doc), r ).
• Verify long (Sketch long (r), doc, y) = Verify c (Sketch(r ), h(doc), y) .
Theorem 5.5. Suppose that the original system is a (T , V )-efficient timestamp system that is α-optimal against feasibly generated documents with parameters ρ and γ for adversaries with running time polynomial in R.
Assume that μ(log |DOC|) is larger than any polynomial in R and that Space(H ) ≤ T . Then the derived scheme allows stamping documents of length R. The scheme is also (T , V + log |H |)-efficient and α-optimal against feasibly generated documents for ρ = ρ + H (log |DOC|) and γ = γ when considering polynomial time adversaries.
Proof. Suppose that, for a particular r and random coins, the adversary can generate and γ -successfully stamp k = α T documents in the original system. Therefore the probability that this event occurs is at most ρ (the adversary against the original system runs the new adversary and then hashes each document it outputs). Otherwise, by the pigeonhole principle, there must be i = j for which h(doc i ) = h(doc j ), thus we can find a collision for h in time polynomial in R. Therefore the probability that this event occurs is at most H (log |DOC|). The total probability of success is thus bounded by ρ + H (log |DOC|).
Combining Theorem 5.5 with the scheme of Theorem 5.2 allows us to obtain a scheme with essentially the same properties while stamping longer documents. This is stated formally in the next theorem, which is a formal restatement of Theorem 1.2. (1) .
Theorem 5.6. Let H be an ( H (n), μ(n))-collision resistant hash family with μ(n)
Assume that the adversary has running time polynomial in R. There exists a scheme that is (T = 2 (log log R) O(1) , V = 2 (log log R) O(1) )-efficient and O(log R)-optimal against feasibly generated documents for ρ = neg(R) and M * max = Ω(R). The scheme allows stamping documents of length R.
Proof. Let a be the constant hidden in the Ω(·) in the definition of μ. We use the scheme guaranteed in Theorem 5.2 choosing c = 2/a. (Note that we can indeed implement this scheme since our assumption gives us a hash function with sufficiently good parameters.) This scheme allows stamping documents of length = 2 (log log R) c . To apply Theorem 5.5 we need to make sure that μ( ) is larger than any polynomial in R. Indeed,
is larger than any polynomial in R. We also need to check that space used to compute H on documents of length is at most T . We have that T = 2 (log log R) a for some constant a > 0. By increasing this constant if necessary we can make sure that T is larger than any polynomial in and so as the hash function runs in polynomial time it must use polynomial space that is smaller than T . It follows that we can apply Theorem 5.5 and obtain a scheme that allows stamping documents of length R. Let us examine the parameters of the scheme. The only losses over the original scheme is that V is longer by a polynomial in which is 2 (log log R) O(1) (that we can afford) and that ρ increased by an additive factor of H that is negligible in R.
A Scheme Using a Non-explicit Expander Graph
It is folklore that there exist very good non-explicit expanders (in fact, almost every random graph is a good expander). For completeness, we give a proof for the following lemma: Proof. We use a probabilistic argument to show that the probability that a random graph with the above parameters is not an expander is less than 1. Let G = (V 1 , V 2 , E) with |V 1 | = N and |V 2 | = M be a random bipartite graph with left degree D constructed by choosing independently and uniformly at random D neighbors (not necessarily distinct) for each vertex v ∈ V 1 . The resulting graph may not be D regular, however, if it is an expander, adding edges will not lower the expansion factor (hence it is enough to show that such a graph is an expander with the required properties). Note that if G is not (K max , (1 − )D)-expanding, there must exist a set S ⊂ V 1 of size less than K max and a set T ⊂ V 2 of size at less than |S|(1 − )D such that Γ (S) ⊆ T . We will bound the probability that such a pair of sets exists.
For a specific pair of sets S ⊂ V 1 and T ⊂ V 2 , the probability that all of S's neighbors are in T is ( |T | M ) |S|D . By the union bound, the probability that there exists a pair of sets S, T where S is exactly of size i ≤ K max is less than
where
, this means that X < 1 2 . Using the union bound again, the total probability that there exists a pair of sets (S, T ) which contradicts the expansion property of the graph is at most
We show that an explicit construction of such a graph implies much better noninteractive timestamping schemes. Specifically: Theorem 5.8. Assume that a graph G as above can be explicitly constructed for
μ(n))-collision resistant hash family with
H (n) = 2 −n Ω(1) and μ(n) = 2 n Ω
(1) . Assume that the adversary has running time polynomial in R. For every c > 0, there exists a scheme that is (T = (log R) O(1) , V = (log R) O(1) )-efficient and O(log R)-optimal against feasibly generated documents for
The scheme allows stamping documents of length log c R.
Proof. We now use non-explicit expanders. We choose n to be large enough so that μ(n) and 1/ H (n) are greater than N log c N . We can meet this requirement with n = (log N) O(1) . This makes N = R/n ≥ √ R. Let d be a constant to be chosen later. We choose D = log d R. We meet all the requirements of Theorem 5.1 and conclude that the scheme is ((log R) O(1) We can now stamp much longer documents (even up to length R) using the techniques of Subsect. 5.5.
Non-malleable Timestamping
For several applications of timestamping, Definitions 3.4 and 3.9 do not seem to suffice. The reason is that they do not preclude the following scenario:
Alice stamps a document doc and stores the timestamp Stamp(doc, r). Eve stores the output of Store * (r). At verification time, Alice publishes doc and Stamp(doc, r). At this point, Eve may be able to use the timestamp for doc in order to successfully stamp a different document (for instance, a document almost identical to doc but which contains the word "Eve" instead of the word "Alice"). Definitions 3.4 and 3.9 do not apply in this case because they only specify which documents Eve can stamp without additional information. In this section we present modified definitions and constructions that work even against adversaries that see many timestamps of documents before being requested to timestamp some other document. Throughout this section we refer to the timestamps seen by the adversary as "hints."
Unfortunately, when the adversary is unbounded we cannot expect to achieve "perfect" non-malleability, in which receiving additional hints does not allow the adversary to stamp anything but those documents. This is because there must exist a document doc 1 whose timestamp contains some non-negligible amount of information about the timestamp of a different document doc 2 . If the adversary stores all but the shared information from doc 1 's timestamp, the additional hint of doc 2 's timestamp will allow the adversary to stamp two documents (while storing less than two timestamps). In addition, there must clearly be a limit to the number of hint documents against which the system remains secure-this is because given the timestamps of enough documents, the adversary can exceed the storage bound.
A slightly weaker version of non-malleability is still possible. Under this definition of non-malleability, we want the addition of "hint" documents to be equivalent to giving the adversary more memory ahead of time (but no hints). This is similar to the idea behind Definition 3.4.
Security Against w Hints
To formally define non-malleable security of a timestamp scheme, we must first formally define the adversary in this model. Our definition is similar to Definition 3.3, however in the new model the adversary is also given a "hint oracle" H . The hint oracle returns the correct timestamp for any document (except for the document the adversary is attempting to stamp). The adversary successfully stamps a document with w hints if it can successfully stamp the document in the sense of Definition 3.3 with at most w queries to the oracle (the hints may depend on the document to be stamped and on the responses to previous hints). More formally: Definition 6.1 (Adversary). An adversary with hints consists of two functions: Store * (r), which produces a short string b, and Stamp * H (doc, b), which, given a document doc, b, and access to the hint oracle H , attempts to produce a timestamp for doc. The space M * of an adversary is the maximal length of Store * (r). 6 An adversary γ -successfully stamps a document doc at (some fixed) r with w hints if it makes at most w queries to H and
where this probability is over the coin tosses of Sketch and the internal random coins of the adversary. We denote the set of documents that an adversary A γ -successfully stamps with w hints for a given string r by Successful We can now use essentially the same definition of security as before: Definition 6.2 (Security Against w Hints). We say that a (T , V )-efficient timestamping scheme is α-optimal against w hints (for ρ > 0, α ≥ 1, γ > 0, and M * max < R) if for every T ≤ M * ≤ M * max and every adversary A with space M * and w hints,
Remark 6.3. The notion of α optimality defined in Definition 6.2 is a little different than that in Definition 3.4, in the sense that we now make the additional restriction and require that M * ≥ T (that is, we only bound adversaries with memory that is sufficient to make at least one honest timestamp). This restriction is added since we do not know how to meet the original definition. Making this additional restriction says that, in the new definition, we do not rule out that "weak" adversaries with memory M * T can somehow stamp α documents. However, as timestamps are of length T , it seems that interesting adversaries are those that have at least this much storage; this is why we feel this modification is not significant.
Remark 6.4 (Usefulness of this Security Notion
). Let us demonstrate the usefulness of this notion by considering the scenario described in the introduction. That is, we assume that there is a random variable V that is uniformly distributed over a large set and its value is not known to Eve at the time of the transmission of the random string. After the transmission of the random string, Eve sees a correct timestamp made by Alice who knew the value of V before the random string was transmitted. That is, Eve sees a timestamp of the document doc = "I Alice say that the value is v".
Eve would like to timestamp the document doc in which the word "Alice" is replaced with "Eve." In our definition of security, this is captured by allowing Eve to see a correct timestamp of the hint document doc before she attempts to stamp the document doc. Our definition of security says that even in such a scenario the number of documents which Eve can successfully stamp is bounded by α M * T . Since V is uniformly distributed, it follows that the probability that the value of V happens to appear in one of these documents is very small, and therefore Eve cannot successfully stamp the document doc even after seeing Alice's timestamp.
A Non-malleable Timestamping Scheme
In this section we revisit the information theoretic timestamping scheme defined in Sect. 4 and show that it is non-malleable although with weaker parameters. We remark that it is also possible to extend the definition and construction in the computational setting to be secure with hints.
We use a graph that is (K max , βD)-expanding for β that is very close to 1 (say, β = 1 − (1/(w + 1) 2 )) ). Loosely speaking, in this setting, if the adversary receives w hints, then this amounts to receiving wD indices "for free." We now claim that for any additional document that the adversary wants to stamp, most indices of this document were not revealed by the hints. This is because if one looks at the set of the hint documents and an additional document, then this set expands to size (w + 1)βD, and we note that
So, intuitively, the hints do not help the adversary by much as he needs to store the additional indices. A more formal argument follows. We prove the following theorem (which is analogous to Theorem 4.1). The parameters in Theorem 6.5 resemble those of Theorem 4.1. The main differences are:
• The new theorem requires a graph with better expansion properties. The expansion factor β is now 1 − 1/8w and in particular needs to be close to one, whereas Theorem 4.1 allows β to be small. In particular, when using the explicit graph of Theorem 2.2, we have β that is a small positive constant, which is not good enough for our purposes.
• The optimality factor α is now O(w 2 ), whereas in Theorem 4.1 the optimality factor can be made O(1) when β is a constant. • The parameter g (which measures the fractions of errors above which the verifier rejects) is now set to 1/100(w + 1), whereas in Theorem 4.1 it was set to 1/5. This creates losses that depend on w in several of the parameters, whereas previously these losses were constants.
• The maximal memory of the adversary M * max is smaller by a multiplicative factor of 1/w 2 compared to Theorem 4.1. This means that even in an optimal graph, where K max D ≈ N , the adversary will only be allowed to store R/w 2 bits from the random string. This should be compared to Theorem 4.1, which allows M * max to approach R when picking g = o(1).
To simplify the parameters, let us focus on w = O (1) ; that is, achieving security against a constant number of hints. In this case, if we have a graph that meets the more stringent requirements of Theorem 6.5, then the timestamping scheme we get has comparable parameters to those obtained in Theorem 4.1.
However, as noted earlier, Theorem 2.2 does not give a graph with an expansion factor β that is close to one. Using non-explicit graphs (such as the one in Sect. 5.6), it is possible to get a scheme with parameters comparable to those in Theorem 4.2 that is secure against a constant number of hints.
Remark 6.6 (Toward Explicit Constructions of Expander Graphs). It seems plausible that combining the technique used in our proof of Theorem 2.2 with the idea of "adding a buffer" (see [26, 31] ) would allow us to construct graphs in which the expansion factor β is 1 − o(1) and the degree is comparable to the degree in our Theorem 2.2.
The Security Proof
We prove Theorem 6.5 in a similar way to the proof of Theorem 4.1. Fixing some adversary A with w hints, we denote by R successful γ (k, w) the set of strings r on which the adversary γ -successfully stamp k documents. We now define the notion of "correct stamping with w hints" in a similar way to Definition 4.3.
Definition 6.7. Let g > 0 be a parameter. An adversary correctly stamps a document doc at r with w hints if Stamp * H (doc, Store * (r)) = r |Γ (doc) and it makes at most w queries to H . An adversary correctly stamps a document doc at r with w hints and at most err errors if the Hamming distance between Stamp * H (doc, Store * (r)) and r |Γ (doc) is at most err and it makes at most w queries to H .
denote the set of random strings r for which there are at least k documents that the adversary correctly stamps with at most err = gβD errors and w hints.
Note that the timestamping system is the same as that in Sect. 4. Thus, from the point of view of the verifier, nothing has changed, and Lemma 4.4 applies. In our terminology we have that:
We now show that any adversary that correctly stamps too many documents with w hints can be used to compress the string r, which in turn gives a contradiction. The overall structure of the proof is similar to the one used in the proof in Lemma 4.5. However, the situation here is somewhat more complicated, since the compression procedure is not allowed to use hints. Instead, we show how to find a set of k documents (which may be different from the one which the adversary is correct on) such that we can use the adversary and some additional information (used to simulate hints) to correctly reconstruct the content of indices adjacent to these documents even without hints. The interplay between the various parameters is also somewhat different from the situation in Lemma 4.5 since we need much more additional memory in order to compensate for not having hints. The proof of Lemma 6.9 appears in Sect. 6.4. We now conclude the proof of Theorem 6.5.
Proof of Theorem 6.5. The efficiency requirement follows immediately as in the proof of Theorem 4.1. We need to show that no adversary with space T ≤ M * ≤ M * max can γ -successfully stamp more than k = αM * Dn documents. Given an adversary that γ -successfully stamps k documents, we meet the requirements of Lemma 6.8, and therefore this adversary correctly stamps k documents with at most err = gβD errors. We now apply Lemma 6.9. We first check that the parameters we chose meet the requirements. This is immediate for the first five requirements. For the sixth requirement, we note that we have required that M * ≥ T = Dn, and therefore k = αM * Dn ≥ α = 16w 2 ≥ 4(w + 1) 2 . We also need to meet the requirement that k ≤ K max − w. We have that
where the second inequality follows from the definition of M * max and α, and the third inequality follows from the requirement that w ≤ K max /2. We also meet the requirement that M * ≤ kDn/4(w + 1), which holds for k = αM * /Dn = 16w 2 M * /Dn. We thus conclude that the probability that the adversary successfully stamps k documents is at most ρ = 2 −nDk/6(w+1) ≤ 2 −nD/6(w+1) for k ≥ 1. 
Proof of Lemma 6.9
We first define a compression function Com(r) for r ∈ R correct (k, w). Let r ∈ R correct (k, w), and let S r denote the set of documents that the adversary correctly stamps with w hints and at most err = gβD errors. We conduct the following process:
• We start with B r ← ∅, • At each step, we take a document doc out of S r . We examine all the documents queried by Stamp * H when given Store * (r) and attempting to stamp doc.
• We add doc to B r and call it a "base document," and we also add to B r all the hint documents queried by Stamp * H that are not already in B r and call them "hint documents." We delete from S r all the hint documents that appear in it, and we also remove doc from S r .
• We continue this process until B r has at least k documents. (Note that at this point B r contains at most k + w documents.)
We define Γ = doc∈B r Γ (doc) that is the set of all indices which are neighbors of documents in B r . For a base document doc ∈ B r , we define BAD(doc) to be the indices of blocks in which Stamp * H makes an error when attempting to stamp doc using correct hints. Let BAD be the union of BAD(doc) over all base documents. Let q be the number of base documents in B r and enumerate the elements of B r by doc 1 , . . . , doc |B r | , where the first q elements are base documents. Let v denote the concatenation of Stamp(r, doc) over all hint documents (that is, the correct timestamping of all hint documents). We define
We now show that, for every r ∈ R correct (k, w), it is possible to reconstruct r given Com(r). When given an index j , we reconstruct r j as follows:
• If j ∈ Γ , then we have r j stored.
• If j ∈ Γ , then it is a neighbor of some document doc ∈ B r . Using the stored information, we can check whether doc is a base document or a hint document.
-If doc is a hint document, then we have its timestamp and we can reconstruct r j .
-If doc is a base document, then we can compute its timestamp as follows: Simulate Stamp * H when attempting to stamp doc (note that we have Store * (r)). Whenever an oracle query is made, the queried document is in B r . If it is a hint document, then we can answer the query. If it is a base document, we recursively start to compute its timestamp. When we complete the simulation of Stamp * H , we "error-correct" this value by checking which indices of the timestamp are in BAD and replacing their content with the correct content that we have stored.
We need to show that: Claim 6.11. The simulation described above stops, and it stops with the correct timestamp of the given base document.
Proof. We define the following relations on base documents: We say that doc 1 appeared after doc 2 denoted by doc 1 doc 2 if in the process of constructing B r , doc 1 was taken from S r after doc 2 . We say that doc 1 We claim that if doc 1 eventually calls doc 2 , then doc 1 appeared after doc 2 . Before verifying this claim, we note that is an ordering of the base documents, and therefore the recursion does not run into an infinite loop and will eventually end. It can be verified by induction that each time the recursive procedure "returns" a timestamp, this timestamp is correct.
We are left with proving that if doc 1 ⇒ * doc 2 , then doc 1 doc 2 . We prove this by induction on the number of calls. For the base case, note that if doc 1 ≺ doc 2 , then it could not be the case that doc 1 ⇒ doc 2 since when removing doc 1 from S r , we have removed from S r all the documents such that doc 1 ⇒ doc 2 and thus could not select doc 2 at a later stage. The same reasoning applies to any number of calls by induction on the number of calls.
We now bound the output length of Com(r).
• Storing |B r | documents takes at most (k + w) log |DOC| bits.
• The length of Store * (r) is at most M * .
• The length of r|Γ is at most R − kβDn. This is because |Γ | ≥ kβD.
• We represent the set BAD by a binary vector of length kD, composed of k blocks (one for each base document in B r ) and the ith bit in a block of a document is set if the document is a base document and the ith block in its timestamp is incorrect.
• The length of r| BAD (in bits) is at most kgβDn. This is because the size of BAD is at most k · err ≤ kgβD.
• The length of v is at most (1 − 1/(w + 1)) · (k + w) · Dn. This is because at least a 1/(w + 1) fraction of the documents in {0, 1} r are base documents (since in each step in the process one out of at most w + 1 documents added to B r is a base document). Thus, out of at most k + w documents in B r a 1 − 1/(w + 1) fraction are hint documents and the time stamp of each one takes Dn bits.
• The length of q is log k.
Overall the total length of the output of Com(r) is bounded by
We note that |Com(r)| ≤ R − Δ for
Thus, we have that |R correct (k, w)| ≤ 2 R−Δ , and therefore the probability that a randomly chosen r lands in R correct (k, w) is at most 2 −Δ . We are left with checking that the requirements in the lemma give that Δ > kDn 100(w+1) . We define A = kDn (w+1) . Let us examine the expression in (2) . Intuitively, we set the parameters so that all the terms apart from the first and sixth terms are small compared to A, and the fact that β is very close to 1 will give that the first term minus the sixth term is Ω(A). (This is the best we can get because no matter how we set the parameters the first term minus the fourth term is at most A.)
We first go over each of the other terms and verify that the requirements we have made make them small compared to A. We have required that log |DOC| ≤ Dn/200(w + 1) and we have that w ≤ k, which gives that (k + w) log |DOC| ≤ 2k log |DOC| ≤ A/100. We have required that M * ≤ A/4. We have required that n ≥ 100(w + 1), which gives that kD ≤ A/100. Note that log k ≤ kD, and therefore log k ≤ A/100. We have required that g ≤ 1/100(w + 1), which gives that kgβDn ≤ A/100.
Overall we have that Δ ≥ kβDn
We now use the requirement that β ≥ 1 − 1/4(w + 1) and compute:
where the last inequality follows from the requirement k ≥ 4 · (w + 1) 2 , which entails w ≤ k/4(w + 1). Thus, we conclude that Δ ≥ A/2 − A/3 = A/6, as required.
An Explicit Expander Construction
Extractors
In this section we prove Theorem 2.2. The proof uses techniques from the area of "randomness extractors." We only briefly describe the needed background from this area, and the interested reader is referred to the survey papers [25, 29] . We begin with some definitions. For a distribution X, we denote X(a) = Pr[X = a]. We measure the distance between two distributions X and Y over the same domain Λ by their 1 
We say that X is -close to Y if their distance is at most . The min-entropy of a distribution X is the maximal k such that for every a, X(a) = Pr[X = a] ≤ 2 −k . Randomness extractors are given an input drawn from some unknown distribution X that is guaranteed to have at least k min-entropy. They also use a short independent random string. The goal is to output a short string (of length k or smaller) such that the output distribution is close to uniform. Formally: 
Universal Extractors
It is easy to see that a (k, )-strong extractor gives rise to a bipartite graph in which every set S of size K = 2 k on the left-hand side expands (where the expansion factor depends on the parameters of the extractor). (We elaborate on this relationship in Sect. 7.3.) The notion of expander graphs used in this paper makes the stronger requirement that there is some threshold K max such that every set of size at most K max expands. While extractors do not suffice for this, universal extractors, that we soon define, give rise to such graphs.
The extractor property guarantees that every distribution X that has a lot of entropy is converted to (close to) the uniform distribution. We now extend this notion to distributions with less entropy as follows. Given an input from an unknown distribution X with some min-entropy k ≤ k max , we require that the randomness-extractor output has a restriction to m(k) bits (where m(k) is some function of k) that is close to uniform. We say that F : {0, 1} n × {0, 1} d → {0, 1} m is a restriction of F : {0, 1} n × {0, 1} d → {0, 1} m if there exists some set S ⊆ {1, .., m} of size m such that F (x, y) = F (x, y)| S , that is, F outputs only the indices of F that are in S. We define: Definition 7.2 (Universal Extractor) [27, 28, 31] . F : {0, 1} n × {0, 1} d → {0, 1} m(k max ) is a strong (k max , k → m(k), )-universal extractor if, for every k ≤ k max , there is a restriction F : {0, 1} n × {0, 1} d → {0, 1} m(k ) of F which is a strong (k , )-extractor. If m(k) = k − Δ, we say that F has Δ entropy loss.
Raz, Reingold, and Vadhan [28] show variants of Trevisan's extractor [33] with optimal entropy loss. Raz et al. note that some of the constructions they give are universal. 7 In particular, the following construction is universal: We would like to reduce the seed length of the above strong extractor from d = O(log 3 (n/ )) to d = O(log n + log 3 (k max / )). Given an unknown distribution X with k ≤ k max entropy, [17] showed how to condense it while essentially retaining all its min-entropy. Formally, they show that a function F : {0, 1} n × {0, 1} d 1 =4(log(n/ )) → {0, 1} m=2(d 1 +k max ) such that, for every distribution X over {0, 1} n with k ≤ k max minentropy, F (X, U d ) is -close to a distribution with k + d 1 min-entropy (see Theorem 4.2 there when setting α = 1). Furthermore, F (x, y) = (y, F (x, y)) for some function F , i.e., the output contains the seed. Thus, the condenser uses d 1 = O(log(n/ )) truly random bits to condense the distribution X (over n bits) to a new distribution X over just m = O(d 1 +k max ) bits while essentially retaining all the min-entropy of the distribution.
If we first apply such a lossless condenser F (x, y) = (y, F (x, y)) and then a strong universal extractor on the second register, we get a strong universal extractor. To see this, notice that, for every distribution X with min-entropy k ≤ k max , F (X, U d ) is -close to a distribution B with k + d 1 min-entropy. In B at most of y get weight larger than 2 · 2 −d 1 . For all other y's, (B|Y = y) has min-entropy at least k − 1. Then, by the universal extractor property, there is a restriction of the output that is close to uniform. In particular, by first applying the [17] condenser and then the extractor of Fact 7.3, we get: 
Graphs and Functions
Randomness extractors are, in fact, equivalent to unbalanced expander graphs, and here we repeat this well-known connection. We translate a function F : {0, 1} n × {0, 
Discussion and Open Problems
Advantages of Our Non-interactive Timestamping Scheme
Let us discuss some obvious advantages of non-interactive timestamping over more standard notions of timestamping.
• The only communication made before the verification process is the transmission of the random string r. This allows the timestamping system to be used in situations where communication is infeasible or undesirable. For example, communication may be asymmetric: one central agency can broadcast to all other users, while the users cannot send messages to the agency.
• Everyone can stamp and everyone can verify, and no central control or acquaintance between stamper and verifier is needed. The decentralized nature of this scheme overcomes many of the "trust" problems with interactive timestamping systems. Even in distributed interactive systems, some measure of trust must be given to third parties. Our non-interactive timestamping system requires only that the random string be truly random and receivable by all parties.
• Privacy. The scheme hides the fact that timestamping occurred at all, e.g., an inventor can safeguard her inventions without revealing even the fact of their existence. This also ensures privacy in an information-theoretic sense.
• Our schemes solve some of the robustness problems that plague interactive timestamping systems. In particular, it is much more difficult to mount a denialof-service attack since there is no central point that can shut down the system, and even temporarily shutting down communications will not prevent the creation of new timestamps. The lack of communication also makes it difficult for an attacker to tell whether such an attack was successful.
Open Problems
Dealing with Errors Most protocols in the bounded storage model, and ours among them, assume that the broadcast random string is received identically and without errors by all parties. However, in many natural implementations of such protocols, this assumption may not be realistic (e.g., when the random string has a natural source).
Our information-theoretic scheme can be made to work even with errors (provided that the error rate is low enough) by allowing the verifier to accept a timestamp even if the blocks in the intersection differ by a small amount. The proof of Lemma 4.5 already allows the adversary to make some errors when stamping and still be considered successful. Increasing the error rate by a small amount will not invalidate the lemma (although the parameters suffer slightly).
The computational scheme, on the other hand, currently requires the random string to be received perfectly by all parties. It is an interesting open question whether this requirement can be removed.
Removing the Need for Constant Monitoring Our timestamping schemes require the verifier to run the Sketch function in every round for which it may, someday, want to verify documents. The verifier must therefore constantly monitor the random string, which is too much to ask from a casual user of the system.
An implementation of our timestamping systems can overcome this difficulty by using "verification centers": dedicated third parties who act as verifiers. In some sense, such third parties appear in all previous timestamping protocols. This raises the issue of how much trust the user must place in the verification center.
In the computational version of our protocol, the verification center is also easily auditable by casual users: the verifier is deterministic and has no secret information. Any user can act as a verifier for a single round and compare its state to that of the verification center: any inconsistency will be instantly visible.
Online Versus Locally-Computable
The strategies for the honest players are efficient in the sense that they work online using small space and polynomial time. A stronger notion of efficiency called "locally-computable" was suggested in [34] . It requires the honest players to store a small substring of the string r. More precisely, the players need to choose a subset S ⊆ [R] before the random string is transmitted and only store r| S . We point out that the "information-theoretic" scheme (Sect. 4) has this additional property, whereas the "computationally-secure" scheme (Sect. 5) does not. 8 Natural open problems are whether the "information-theoretic" scheme can be improved to yield better parameters and whether the "computationally-secure" scheme can be improved to run with strategies that are locally computable.
